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Will	Sri	Lanka	manage	to	perform	the	balancing	act
between	China	and	India?
Given	the	strategic	competition	and	growing	rivalry	between	China	and	India,	it	is	inherently	in	the
island’s	national	interest	to	have	a	balanced	approach	while	dealing	with	the	two	powers.		As	China
exerts	more	power	in	South	Asia,	raising	India’s	concern’s	of	a	‘Chinese	Threat’,	Sri	Lanka	needs
continue	to	be	on	good	terms	with	both	nations	writes	Shakthi	De	Silva.	
“It	is	for	the	people	of	Asia	to	run	the	affairs	of	Asia,	solve	the	problems	of	Asia,	and	uphold	the	security
of	Asia,”	Chinese	President	Xi	remarked	at	the	2014	Conference	on	Interaction	and	Confidence-Building	Measures	in
Asia.	But	can	the	two	rapidly	surging	Asian	countries	live	in	co-existence	and	collaborate	with	one	another,
respecting	each	party’s	security	and	economic	concerns	in	their	quest	to	‘run	the	affairs	of	Asia’?
Over	the	years,	China	has	demonstrated	a	growing	aspiration	to	exert	leadership	through	various	multi-
lateral	platforms.	Regional	Comprehensive	Economic	Partnership,	BRICS,	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	(BRI),	the	Asian
Infrastructure	Investment	Bank	(AIIB),	and	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organisation	(SCO)	clearly	manifest
this	desire.	Incidentally,	Sri	Lanka	is	a	member	of	the	AIIB,	and	BRI	and	is	a	dialogue	partner	of	the	SCO.	Among
these	initiatives,	Chinese	scholars	view	the	BRI	as	the	zenith	of	China’s	projects,	setting	a	new	international	order
and	a	model	for	regional	cooperation	and	international	economic	integration.
China	and	India:	A	tug	of	war
Undeniably	BRI	is	redefining	the	China-India	relationship	notwithstanding	India’s	refusal	to	be	part	of	it.	The	myriad	of
projects	spanning	Asia	to	Europe	which	come	under	the	umbrella	of	BRI	alongside	Chinese	soft	and	hard	power
strategies,	demonstrates	Beijing’s	desire	to	replace	or	restructure	America’s	unipolarity	with	a	world	order	of	its	own.
Naturally,	this	increases	the	complexity	and	difficulty	in	mollifying	fears,	especially	India’s	concern,	of	a	“Chinese
Threat”.
The	most	important	security	mechanism	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region,	i.e.	the	US	hub-and-spokes	bi-lateral	security
system	beheld	Chinese	inroads	into	regions	once	considered	as	America’s	sphere	of	influence.	China	now	boasts	of
a	security	involvement	with	the	four	principle	sub-regions	of	Asia	and	the	Pacific	(North	East	Asia,	South	East	Asia,
South	Asia	and	Central	Asia).
Former	Premier	Wen	Jiabao	noted,	“There	is	enough	space	in	the	world	for	the	development	of	both	China	and
India.”	But	many	Indian	scholars	and	think-tanks	consider	China’s	incursions	in	South	Asia	as	an	effort	to	encircle
India	with	a	long-term	intention	of	reducing	India’s	status	and	influence	as	a	regional	power.
Over	the	last	few	years	tensions	between	the	two	states	have	been	simmering.	Beijing	barred	New	Delhi	from
becoming	a	member	of	the	Nuclear	Suppliers	Group,	blocked	India’s	attempts	to	list	Masood	Azhar	as	a	terrorist	at
the	United	Nations,	and	even	routed	its	energy	pipelines	through	disputed	territory	in	Kashmir	showcasing	scant
regard	for	India’s	calls	for	the	pipelines	to	be	re-routed.	A	recent	Pew	Research	survey	captured	this	bubbling	tension
rather	lucidly.	According	to	its	assessment,	India’s	public	perception	of	China	had	declined	from	a	35	per
cent	favourable	outlook	in	2013	to	just	26	per	cent	by	2017.
In	2017,	China	entered	into	a	Free	Trade	Agreement	with	Maldives;	the	China-Pakistan	Economic	Corridor	is	in	full
swing	and	Nepal	is	presently	increasingly	inclined	towards	Beijing.	Plans	are	already	underway	to	establish	a	second
Chinese	military	base	in	the	Indian	Ocean,	this	time	in	Pakistan	close	to	the	Chabahar	Port	in	Iran,	in	which	India	has
a	significant	stake.	As	China’s	power	and	influence	grows	across	India’s	neighbours,	New	Delhi	views	this	with
undisguised	apprehension.	What	should	be	Sri	Lanka’s	strategy	in	these	changing	and	challenging	times?
What	next	for	Colombo?
There	are	diverse	approaches	states	adopt	when	delineating	their	foreign	policy.	According	to	academics,	small	state
foreign	policy	options	include	external	balancing	(building	partnerships	with	external	actors	to	counter	a	threat	from
the	region),	internal	balancing	(strengthening	the	country’s	defence	forces),	bandwagoning	(aligning	with	the
dominant	country),	and	hedging.
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External	balancing	has	no	efficacy	for	Sri	Lanka	given	the	lack	of	military	threat	(regionally	or	extra-regionally)	to	the
island.	Bandwagoning	with	Beijing	or	New	Delhi	as	well	as	hedging	the	two	powers,	remains	unlikely	given	the
island’s	close	economic	ties	with	both.	Both	options	involve	choosing	one	party	over	the	other,	something	Sri	Lanka
is	not	in	a	position	to	do.	To	emphasise	this	point	a	simple	example	suffices:	The	island’s	largest	portion	of	FDI	in
2017	is	from	China	followed	closely	by	India.	Conversely,	Chinese	tourist	arrivals	account	for	13	per	cent	of	total
tourist	arrivals	to	the	island.	This	is	second	only	to	India.
A	balanced	foreign	policy	would	necessitate	friendly	relations	with	Beijing	and	New	Delhi
without	being	partial	towards	one	at	the	expense	of	the	other.	Image	credit:	Flickr/Nimal
Skandhakumar/CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0
Internal	balancing	alone	remains	impractical	given	the	island’s	weak	defence	capability	when	compared	with	that	of
regional	powers.	Indeed,	internal	balancing	should	be	tied	to	a	more	concrete	economic	and	political	strategy.	This
strategy	should	be	one	of	adopting	a	balanced	approach	while	dealing	with	the	two	powers.	A	balanced	foreign
policy	would	necessitate	friendly	relations	with	Beijing	and	New	Delhi	without	being	partial	towards	one	at	the
expense	of	the	other.	This	grants	Sri	Lanka	the	ability	to	refrain	from	entangling	in	bi-lateral	disputes	between	the	two
powers.	Additionally,	it	allows	the	island	to	seek	economic	assistance	from	both	powers	while	remaining	neutral	if
and	when	a	crisis	emerges	between	New	Delhi	and	Beijing.
Unlike	the	former	Rajapakse	regime,	the	present	administration	appears	to	realise	the	importance
of	maintaining	a	balanced	approach	in	its	foreign	policy.	This	is	evident	from	President	Sirisena’s	2015	manifesto,
which	emphasised	his	desire	to	maintain	“equal	relations”	with	both	states.	Not	only	has	the	island	demonstrated
its	recognition	of	Indian	security	concerns	–	clearly	visible	by	Sri	Lanka’s	refusal	to	allow	a	Chinese	nuclear
submarine	to	dock	when	the	Indian	Prime	Minister	was	visiting	–	but	President	Sirisena	is	also	keen	to	utilise	the
growing	affinity	between	himself	and	PM	Modi	to	draw	India	to	jointly	manage	operations	in	the	Mattala	Airport.		As
recently	as	November	last	year	Prime	Minister	Ranil	Wickremesinghe	visited	New	Delhi	to	meet	PM	Modi,	and	this
month	saw	the	two	countries	signing	an	MOU	to	enhance	cooperation	in	areas	of	cyber	security	and	e-Governance.
Given	the	strategic	competition	and	growing	rivalry	outlined	above,	it	is	inherently	in	the	island’s	national	interest	to
balance	the	two	powers.	Not	only	would	this	promote	a	healthy	investment	climate	but	it	would	also	enable	Sri	Lanka
to	cultivate	amicable	ties	with	both	powers	even	in	a	context	where	the	two	may	not	look	eye	to	eye.
However,	public	outrage	concerning	the	$8	billion	of	debt	to	Beijing	and	the	degree	of	strategic	competition	between
the	two	powers	in	the	island	has	also	raised	complex	issues.	There	are	also	concerns	regarding	the	‘debt	to	equity
swap’	approach	being	followed	by	Sri	Lanka.	Will	Sirisena’s	decision	to	hand	over	the	Hambantota	Port	on	a	99
year	lease	to	the	China	Merchant	Port	Holdings	in	return	for	writing-off	of	$1.1	billion	of	the	island’s	debt	become	a
trademark	of	the	Unity	government’s	foreign	policy	or	will	it	simply	be	a	one-off	incident?
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Continuing	to	rely	on	borrowing	for	the	short-term	health	of	the	economy	has	proven	to	be	an	impractical	option.	Poor
economic	policies	in	the	past	put	Sri	Lanka’s	financial	autonomy	and	policy	independence	in	jeopardy.	While	the
Sirisena	government	has	expressed	its	commitment	to	rectify	this,	the	tendency	to	view	such	debt	to	equity	swaps	as
a	panacea	to	financial	problems	may	exacerbate	tensions	on	the	domestic	front.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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